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1. Introduction 
There have been extensive and complicated debates on how the state law and social 
norm interact with each other. This argument dates back to Thomas Hobbes when he 
claimed in his famous passage that “To this warre of every man against every 
man…nothing can be unjust. The Notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice 
have no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no Law, no 
Injustice….”1 After the advent of Hobbes, John Locke made a counter-argument to the 
effect that the state of nature has its own order that he calls the Natural Law. Then, 
David Hume went one step further and argued that the pre-legal rules of justice are 
justifiable as establishing the common good among people.2 Contrary to the Hobbesian 
view, Locke and Hume found that the law does not establish a new legal rule from 
scratch, but that it supersedes the pre-legal norm.3 In their view, the spontaneous order 
theory of the law that is prominent in the Chicago-school, which asserts that 
decentralized social forces play a crucial role in shaping the social order, seems to have 
already been set forth.4 
  Issues in the above theory that remain obscure are regarding how the law and the 
social norm interact with each other in the legalized modern society, whether the law 
completely replaces the pre-existing social norm or they coexist, and whether their 
interaction achieves an efficient system of social rules or there is innate inefficiency.  
  A much more recent, yet no less important contribution by Ellickson (1991) has 
revealed that in many critical aspects, law is irrelevant for the protection of social order 
and is overridden by the social norm in the settlement of dispute over the protection of 
legal right within a close-knit society. Another fundamental contribution by Macaulay 
                                                   
1 Hobbes (1651, part 1, chapter 13). 
2 Locke (1690) asserted the existence of the Law of Nature and justified the property 
right as its fundamental pillar. Hume (1740, book 3, part 2, section 6) emphasized that 
the system of the rules of justice is not intended by the persons who invented them to 
serve as means for public benefit, but is in its result very beneficial for people in 
general. 
3 As this article discusses, their arguments were succeeded by Hart (1994) in the area of 
jurisprudence. 
4 The spontaneous order theory of law was most eloquently extended by Hayek (1960, 
1973). See also Demsetz (1967) and Posner (1981, ch.5-8) for the study of the 
development of law and justice in the pre-legal society. 
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(1963) showed the same phenomenon particularly for the case of contract. 
  The purpose of this article is to provide an analytical model to clarify the 
interrelationship between the law and the social norm to provide some suggestions for 
the above problems. It aims to complement the research in Macaulay and Ellickson, 
which adopted a more empirically oriented approach. 
  The next section presents an analysis of our basic model, and section 3 discusses its 
legal and economic implications, where we show that in the basic model, 
non-cooperative interaction between the law and social norm attains efficiency and that 
they are perfect substitutes to each other. Section 4 considers the cases where social 
norm is determined on the basis of some misperceptions. In this model, we show the 
possibility that an inefficient social system may persist. Furthermore, we illustrate the 
possibility that law and social norm are complements to each other and that the 
existence of the government could be second-best. Finally, section 5 briefly concludes the 
study. 
 
2. Basic Model 
Our model is based on the description of the society adopted by the classical article of 
Coase (1960), where a nuisance dispute occurs and may be relieved by the court 
adopting either the establishment of a legal right or the assignment of the liability. We 
assume, for simplicity of the analysis, that the regulatory tool for recovering the 
efficient allocation of the activity is the strict liability rule to the injurers irrespective of 
whether it is a social norm or is promulgated as law.  
  This means that a substantive norm is assumed to be identical regardless of whether 
it is a social norm or a law. The remedial norm is definitely different depending on 
whether the rule is a law or a social norm.5 If the rule is legal, we assume, again for 
simplicity, the public officer claims appropriate damages to injurers with the help of 
state force. When it is a social norm, this explicit exercise of state power is not allowed. 
Therefore, the remedial norms should also be informal, for example, gossips for the 
defective activities.6     
  Let us consider a society where the basic property right is established, and some 
activity causes harm to the established property right, for example, noise, danger to 
health, and intrusion of land. We suppose that the society comprises two types of 
various identical people: injurers and victims. Injurers engage in privately beneficial 
                                                   
5 For a relevant distinction between the substantive norm and the remedial norm (and 
other kind of norms), see Ellickson (1991, ch.11-14).  
6 See Ellickson (1991, pp.211-221) for an informal enforcement of liability rule by 
non-legal social relationship. 
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activity, e.g., listening to music. We denote this activity as a, which provides benefit 
b(a) to the injurer who enjoyed. This activity simultaneously causes harm, e.g., noise, 
to the victim, which costs c(a). When engaging in their activity, the injurers are not 
conscious about this external cost, and they choose the level of activity neglecting this 
external cost c(a). This means that the injurers choose an extremely high level of 
activity relative to the socially efficient level if there is no regulation either by law or 
social norm. 
We conduct a standard partial-equilibrium analysis where the marginal utility of 
money is constant and the aggregate social surplus (or“wealth”in Richard Posner’s 
term) indicates the level of social welfare in monetary terms. All the people belonging to 
the two parties are identical, and hence, the benefit of the representative injurer minus 
the cost incurred by the representative victim, b a − c(a) shows social surplus.  
We suppose that the enforcement of liability requires additional social cost, whether 
it is implemented through the community or the government. When liability is levied by 
the community or the government, we denote the level of liability damage per unit of 
activity as dc and dg respectively, and unit enforcement cost of levying damage as ec 
and eg. Thus, the social surplus including the enforcement cost is b a − c a − ec dca −
egdga.7 
We suppose that both the community and the government try to maximize this 
surplus within the constraint they face with respect to the information available and 
the incentive of the injurers in adopting their levels of activity. This assumption is based 
on the wealth maximization hypothesis by Richard Posner.8 The welfare maximization 
hypothesis for the working of social norm was presented by Ellickson (1991, ch.10), and  
its implications and limitations are extensively discussed. Some further implications 
and the relevancy of this assumption will be discussed in the next section.  
The basic incentive constraint they face as to the choice of activity is that the 
injurers choose the level to equate the marginal benefit of the activity b′ a  to the 
marginal damage cost dc + dg, i.e., b′(a) =  dc + dg . 
 
3. Socially Optimal Interaction between the Law and Social Norm 
3.1 Analysis 
                                                   
7 We assume that the damage levels levied by the community and the government are 
nonnegative, i.e., dc ≥ 0, dg ≥ 0.  We also assume that −1 < ec − eg < 1, which means 
that the strategies of the community and the government, dc  and dg  are strategic 
substitutes of each other. 
8 See Posner (1981, ch.3) and Landes and Posner (1987, pp.1-24). As is well known, this 
hypothesis is criticized in many ways; however, we believe that it is useful as a 
first-order approximation to government behavior, at least in the case of tort law. 
4 
 
Let us proceed to analyze the basic model presented in the last section and deduce its 
consequences. In our model, two principals, namely, the community and the government, 
maximize social surplus with respect to their own policy tools dc and dg , with the 
incentive constraint of the injurers and the strategy of the other party as given. 
Therefore, the government chooses dg   to maximize 
(1)               b a∗ − c a∗ − ec dca∗ − egdga∗  
for a given dc with the constraint 
(2)                b′(a∗) =  dc + dg,  
and the community chooses dc for a given dg to maximize (1) subject to (2). 
  For the following analysis, we parameterize the model to derive explicit solutions. We 
suppose that b a = α𝑙𝑛a and c a = βa. From this parameterization, the constraint in 
(2) boils down to the explicit solution of a∗ as a∗ =  
α
dc +dg
 . Substituting it into (1) and 
choosing dg  to maximize (1) given dc , we can find the optimal strategy dg∗ of the 
government. The first-order condition with respect to dg can be solved as 
(3)              dg∗ =    β + dc(ec −  eg − 1)   if   dg∗ > 0, 
                           
                           0                  if   dg∗ > 𝛽 + dc(ec −  eg − 1). 
This first-order condition can be illustrated as a Nash response function in Fig 1a.  
[Figure 1a about here] 
   Similarly, we can solve the maximization problem of the community and derive the 
first-order condition with respect to dc given dg as 
(4)           dc∗ =    β + dg(eg −  ec − 1)      if   dc∗ > 0, 
                           
                           0                  if   dc∗ > 𝛽 + dg(eg −  ec − 1). 
This condition is illustrated as a Nash response function in Fig. 1b. 
[Figure 1b about here] 
  Now, let us superimpose the two Nash response functions and find the Nash 
equilibrium strategies (dg∗, dc∗) as an intersection of the two response functions. As 
Figure 2 shows, the equilibrium depends on the level of eg and ec . 
[Figure 2a, 2b about here] 
When eg > ec , dg∗ = 0 and dc∗ = β is the Nash equilibrium, which means that the 
liability for the nuisance dispute is exclusively levied by the community, and the 
government refrains from the resolution of the disputes, as shown in Figure 2a. In 
contrast, when eg < ec is satisfied, dg∗ = β and dc∗ = 0, which means that liability to 
the nuisance is levied exclusively through the law, and social norm does not deter the 
nuisance at all. In the middle case where eg = ec , any combination of the liability 
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damages (dg∗, dc∗) that satisfies dg + dc = β can be an equilibrium. Finally, it is obvious 
that all of these equilibria are Pareto efficient. Therefore, the interaction of the law and 
social norm in this basic model is socially optimal. 
 
3.2 Interpretation 
The implications of the analysis in the previous subsection are evident. When there is a 
difference in the enforcement cost for the two branches of the society, the community 
and the government, it is more efficient to use only one branch that can enforce the 
norm with cheaper cost, for controlling the order of the society.9 
  However, in the Nash equilibrium we analyzed, we assumed that both branches 
pursue independently to maximize social efficiency. With this assumption, the more 
efficient branch of the society provides more liability for the deterrence of harm given 
the strategy of the less efficient branch. Once the more efficient branch extends the 
level of liability, the less efficient branch decreases the level of liability to save its 
enforcement cost. This process continues until only the more efficient branch 
exclusively provides liability system. Therefore, social wealth maximization is attained 
in the Nash equilibrium. 
  Which equilibrium is more relevant for our society? This surely depends on the 
relative amount of the enforcement costs eg and ec. One natural interpretation is that 
ec is cheaper than eg, since the enforcement by the community does not require a 
formal legal system, including, a judge and police. In this case, the community plays the 
role of controlling the order and the government refrains from the enforcement of formal 
law. It is this observation that Ellickson (1991) has found out within the close-knit 
society. According to him, many disputes within such a small community are resolved 
through the internal norm of the community itself without reference to the formal law 
or the help of the judiciary of the government. 
  For the classical thinkers of the government, such as Locke and Hume, the argument 
was the opposite. For them, it is the inefficiency and inadequacy of the informal social 
norm and its enforcement power for protecting the social order that called for the 
existence of the government and the law. Their argument was succeeded in the area of 
legal theory by the classical contribution by Hart (1994).  
According to Hart, the law is defined as the union of primary and secondary rules (see 
Hart (1994, pp.79-99)). Here, the primary rules of obligation are those rules that are 
                                                   
9 If there is no difference, any combination of the enforcement by the two branches can 
be optimal. It is also obvious from the discussion below that social efficiency is attained 
at the Nash equilibrium in this case. 
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directly imposed on the citizens. A system of primary rules exists even in the pre-legal 
society and it could form a meaningful social order, but there are several inconveniences 
for the society that only adheres to primary rules. This is summarized by Hart in three 
points. The first aspect is uncertainty, which means that there is no procedure to resolve 
disputes when there arises a question as to what the rules are or the precise scope of 
some given rule. The second aspect is the static character, which means the lack of 
deliberately adapting to the rules according to changing circumstances. The third 
aspect is inefficiency, which means that there are no official agencies to enforce rules 
authoritatively and that the enforcements are left to the individuals affected or to the 
group at large (op. cit. pp.91-94). He argues that such problems of the pre-legal society 
are overcome by introducing three types of secondary rules that confer on individuals to 
make authoritative decisions (op. cit., pp.94-98)). 
In our present context, the most relevant issue is the inefficiency of the society 
governed only by primary rules. In contrast to the previous argument, Hart argues that 
the world without any public organization for the enforcement of law is inefficient 
because in this world, many harmful activities are not deterred and disputes are left 
unresolved; this leads to substantial social cost that can be avoided by introducing the 
secondary rules of adjudication and establishing a public system of judiciary.10 A simple 
way to reflect Hart’s observation in our analysis is to assume that enforcement cost of 
the community is larger than that of the government, i.e., eg < ec. In this case, as our 
analysis shows, the pre-legal society is totally replaced with the legal world that 
incorporates the rule of adjudication by the state. 
Summarizing the argument in this section, in our model where both the community 
and the government pursue efficient order independently, the resulting Nash 
equilibrium attains efficiency. In the equilibrium, either the government refrains from 
any legal regulations and the social order is totally controlled by community 
enforcement, or the informal regulations by the community is completely replaced with 
the legal regulation by the government depending on which system has a lower 
enforcement cost for adjudication. This means that there is no complementarity 
between the law and social norm, and they are perfect substitutes to each other. 
 
4. The Sources of Inefficiency and Complementarity 
The arguments in the previous section show that the optimal system of social regulation 
                                                   
10 See Hart (1994, pp.93-94, 96-97). Locke (1690, chapter 9, paragraph 125) has already 
stated the following: “In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, 
with authority to determine all differences according to the established law.” 
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uses only one mode of governance, depending on the relative cost-effectiveness of its 
enforcement. Once it is assumed that both community and the government try to 
maximize social wealth, the resulting non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is also optimal. 
   By relaxing the assumption of the rational wealth maximization by the community 
in this section, we illustrate the possibility of the existence of Nash equilibria that are 
not socially optimal when enforcement by the community is more cost-effective than 
that by the government. In this case, two interesting phenomena will occur. First, the 
introduction of the law by the state could improve or worsen social welfare. Second, 
there is a possibility of coexistence of both community norm and the law. 
 
4.1 The Case where the Community Determines Social Norm without Considering its 
Effect on the Enforcement Cost of Law 
In the model we analyzed in the last section, it was assumed that social norm is chosen 
to maximize social wealth. In particular, it was assumed that this optimization takes 
into account the effect of social norm on the enforcement cost of the law. Given that 
social norm is spontaneous and it is determined in a decentralized manner, this 
assumption may not be quite relevant in some situations. We assume in this subsection 
instead that social norm neglects its effect on the enforcement cost of the law. Therefore, 
social norm is now determined by the maximization of b a∗ − c a∗ − ec dca∗  with 
respect to dc, with the constraint in (2). 
  Adopting the same parametrization of the model in the previous section, the 
first-order condition is as follows: 
 
(5) dc∗ =    β − dg( ec + 1)                if   dc∗ > 0, 
                           
                           0                  if   dc∗ > 𝛽 − dg( ec + 1). 
 
Now superimposing the new Nash response function in (5) over the response function of 
the government in (3), we find a situation depicted in Figure 3 for the case ec < eg, i.e., 
enforcement by the community is more cost-effective than that by the government.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
As this figure shows, there are three Nash equilibria of the non-cooperative game. 
However, the equilibrium that uses both modes of governance dc   and dg can be easily 
checked as being unstable. Therefore, the two equilibria that use one mode of 
governance to the level β are stable. It is obvious that the equilibrium that uses only 
dc to that level is efficient, and therefore there is now a possibility that inefficient 
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equilibrium, which uses the law as the method of governance, survives.   
  The intuition is as follows. When the community chooses social norm without 
considering its effect on the law enforcement cost, its deterrence level decreases because 
the positive effect of the social norm to the law enforcement cost reduction owing to the 
decrease in activity is neglected. The decrease in the level of social norm is stronger 
when the level of dg is high because the neglected effect of social norm on the reduction 
of law enforcement cost is larger when the deterrence level of the law is high.  
  It cannot be precisely determined as to which of the two equilibria is likely to realize. 
However, this result indicates that once the society is already legalized, it is unlikely 
that the social norm prevails and replaces the law in a decentralized manner even if it is 
a more efficient method of regulation.  
 
4.2 The Case where the Community Underevaluates the Cost of Activity 
It is likely that the community determines the level of social norm with some 
misperceptions of social parameters. Hart (1994, pp.92-93) defined this shortcoming of 
the social norm as the static character, which means the lack of deliberately adapting to 
the rules according to changing circumstances. For example, the parameter of the 
marginal social cost of activity β  can change depending on the changing social 
situations. When β means the marginal social cost of the noisy activity, this β can 
quickly increase as the society becomes larger and more densely populated. However, it 
is quite reasonable to assume that the traditional social norm is determined on the 
basis of older information on the damage occurred by the noise, or it is resistant to the 
adjustment owing to its character as a traditional convention.  
  We now capture this misperception effect of the community by evaluating the level of 
true β as θβ, 0 < 𝜃 < 1, where θ shows the parameter of the level on misperception by 
the community. With this change, the new maximization problem that the community 
faces is to choose dc to maximize 
(6)              b a∗ − θc a∗ − ec dca∗ − egdga∗  
for a given dg with the constraint in (2). Again, adopting the same parameterization 
with the previous cases, the first-order condition for the community is now summarized 
as 
 
dc
∗
 =    θβ + dg(eg −  ec − 1)   if   dc∗ > 0, 
(7)                           
                           0    if   dc∗ > 𝜃𝛽 + dg(eg −  ec − 1). 
  Superimposing the two Nash response functions (3) and (7) for the case ec < eg , we 
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see several possibilities for the Nash equilibrium. When θ is close to one, only the 
community norm is adopted for the social regulation and the efficiency of the 
equilibrium is preserved. When θ is close to zero so that the misperception of the 
community is very serious, dg∗ = β is chosen and only the legal regulation prevails. For 
a medium level of β, the equilibrium depicted in Figure 4 arises, i.e., two modes of social 
regulation, the law and social norm coexist.11 
[Figure 4 about here] 
The intuition behind the result is evident. When the community considerably 
under-evaluates the level of social cost of the nuisance, the level of liability imposed by 
the community is less than sufficient, and it is not optimal to depend on the community 
enforcement for controlling the activity, even if the enforcement cost by social norm is 
cheaper than the law. If the under-provision of the social norm is very conspicuous, the 
government chooses high liability for the harm and replaces the enforcement by the 
social norm completely. However, if this under-provision of informal liability is not 
sufficiently strong, the government chooses a mild level of legal liability, and uses both 
the law and the social norm in a complementary manner for the control of social order. 
  Ellickson (1991, p.249) hypothesized that members of close-knit groups employ and 
mix informal and legal systems of social control in a manner that minimizes members’ 
total costs. This is what has happened in the present case. With regard to the 
administrative cost, it is socially best to use only the social norm for the control of the 
society. However, when there is a misperception within the provision of social norm, 
additional deadweight loss arises owing to the under-provision of liability damage for 
tort. If this under-provision is serious enough, the community adopts both the social 
norm and the law complementarily to minimize the total costs for the members, which 
in our case is the sum of the administrative cost and the deadweight loss owing to the 
incompleteness of the spontaneous liability system. Furthermore, it is even possible 
that only the legal liability system controls disexternalities without any inputs from 
social norm if the misperception for the provision of social norm is extremely serious. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This article presented a model analysis of the interaction between the law and social 
                                                   
11 Formally three cases can occur. First, when θ ≥
1
1+eg −ec
 , dc=θβ and dg=0, i.e., only 
social norm is used. Second, when 1 + ec − eg < 𝜃 <
1
1+eg −ec
 , dc > 0 and dg >0, i.e., 
both the law and social norm are complementarily used for controlling the social order. 
Third, when θ ≤ 1 + ec − eg , dc=0 and dg=β, i.e., only the law is used for the social 
control. 
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norm where the strict liability rule for tort can be levied either by the government or a 
community with different enforcement cost. When these two branches both act as 
rational welfare maximizers, the resulting non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is Pareto 
efficient. In contrast, if the community chooses social norm with misperceptions, 
inefficient Nash equilibrium might arise by the legal intervention of the government. In 
some other cases, there is a possibility that the introduction of the law could be 
second-best even if the enforcement cost using social norm is cheaper than that of the 
law. 
  While our model builds on several simplifications, the real interaction between the 
law and social norm is far more complex. This means that it should be a very proliferate 
area for future research in law and economics.12 However, it appears that most studies 
in this area hitherto are chiefly either descriptive or empirical, and explicit model 
analyses are rather limited. We hope that our analytical research will provide some 
insight for encouraging further study in this area. 
  
                                                   
12 See McAdams and Rasmusen (2007) for the most recent extensive survey of the 
development of research in this area. 
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